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SEQUENCING  SOCIAL  SECURITY,
PENSION  AND INSURANCE  REFORM
Dimitri Vittas
This  is an  expanded  version of a  paper  presented  at  a  seminar
organized by KPMG and the Brookings Institution on Sequencing
Financial Sector Reform on October 3 and 4, 1994.I.  INTRODUCTION
This paper discusses  briefly the sequencing  of social security, pension and insurance  reform in
developing countries.  For both economic and regulatory reasons, most developing countries have
underdeveloped  pension funds and insurance sectors, while their social security systems face many
financial and organizational  problems.  A wide-ranging  social security, pension and insurance reform
would have considerable  economic  and social benefits.
A restructured  social security system would avoid financial  insolvency  and would be better able
to meet its redistributive  objectives. The development  of pension funds and insurance  business would
generate  large amounts  of long-term  financial  resources  that could  stimulate  the growth of capital  markets
and could also be better able to provide  adequate  and affordable  long-term  benefits to their members  and
policyholders.
The paper is divided into six sections.  Following this brief introduction, the next section
discusses the reasons for the underdevelopment  of contractual savings and insurance in developing
countries. Section  III reviews  briefly the state of social  security in different countries, while section  IV
discusses  the benefits  of reform. Section  V focuses  on the sequencing  of reforms. It is itself  divided into
four subsections that deal respectively  with the restructuring and downsizing of social pensions, the
creation  of a multi-pillar  structure, the streamlining  of the regulatory  framework,  and the formulation  of
a transition plan.  The paper ends with a short concluding  section.
II.  DETERMINANTS  OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT
Except for a few countries such as Chile, Fiji, Malaysia,  Singapore  and South Africa and, to a
lesser degree, Cyprus, Egypt, Korea and Zimnbabwe,  most developing countries have very  small
contractual  savings sectors. In the vast majority  of developing  countries,  the assets of pension funds and
1insurance  companies  correspond to well below 10% of GDP, whereas in the countries listed above and
in several developed countries  they exceed 30%, and in some cases well over 70% of GDP.
Low Income and Wealth.  Perhaps the most important reason for the underdevelopment  of
contractual  savings  and insurance  business  in developing  countries  is the low level of income and wealth.
Poor households  cannot  afford to put aside large sums of money  for their future needs. Also households
with few possessions  have less need  for property  and casualty  insurance. Although  high growth countries
experience  a high rate of saving, such saving is usually first placed in bank deposits and other liquid
instruments.
It is only after income and savings reach a reasonably  high level that putting money aside for
retirement and old age benefits becomes feasible. Similarly,  the insurance  habit to cover property and
casualty losses starts to spread only after people acquire substantial  possessions  and become concerned
about the effects  of accidental  losses.
Extended  Family Support. In most developing  countries, poor households  live in rural areas
where people depend in old age on the support of their extended  families. There is therefore less need
for saving through formal institutions, such as insurance companies and pension funds.  But as the
extended  families  break up with economic  growth and urbanization,  the need for alternative  arrangements
clearly increases.
High Inflation. However, not all developing  countries  suffer from such low income  and wealth.
Many developing  countries  have incomes  and wealth that would  justify a strong demand  for contractual
savings outlets and for insurance  services. What holds back the development  of contractual  savings and
insurance in  these countries is  often the  prevailing macroeconomic  environment and  regulatory
framework. High inflation  has a particularly  adverse  effect. Pension  funds and life insurance  companies
cannot function properly in a highly inflationary  environment,  unless they are based on fully indexed
contracts.  But full indexation is problematic in countries with very high inflation rates.  Nonlife
2insurance  also suffers  heavily from high inflation  as houses  and other assets  become easily underinsured
(unless contracts are indexed), while  the cost of claims that insurance companies  have to pay becomes
difficult  to predict and is affected  by long delays in settlement.
Repressive Regulation. The generally repressive regulatory framework also has a negative
impact because it  impedes competition, innovation and efficiency.  The insurance sector is often
dominated  by one or two state-owned  companies,  while entry by privately  owned companies  as well as
foreign companies  is discouraged. Both premiums and new products are subject to vetting and control
by regulatory agencies  that are staffed with bureaucrats  rather than experienced  professionals. A major
problem is often the imposition  of investment  rules that force pension funds  and insurance  companies  to
invest  their assets in government  bonds with highly negative  real rates of return.
The insurance sector of most developing countries is characterized  by inadequate  capital, low
investment  returns, high operating  costs, lax control over brokers, high levels  of receivables,  fraud and
unduly high claims by some insured but otherwise low claims and settlements for the majority of
customers,  and protracted  disputes and long delays in settlement.
Mutual  Mistrust. In most developing  countries, there is widespread  mutual mistrust between
insurance  companies  and their customers. This is aggravated  by the information  problems  that afflict the
insurance industry.  Thus, insurance companies impose various restrictions and conditions on their
policies to protect themselves from  "adverse selection" (e.g.,  when ill people seek to  obtain life
insurance), "moral hazard" (e.g, when insured people do not take measures to prevent accidents  from
happening)  and outright fraud (e.g., arson in the case of fire policies). But such restrictions give rise to
disputes and delays in settlement  that undermine  the confidence  of the public in the honesty and integrity
of insurers, causing  a decline  in the demand  for insurance  services. This widespread  mistrust affects  not
only relations with households but also business with both large and small firms.  Without proper
3insurance,  industry  and commerce  suffer  from undue exposure  to fire and other  hazards,  which when  they
occur can debilitate  a company.
III.  STATE OF SOCIAL  SECURITY
Design Faults.  The development  of pensions funds and life insurance  companies  is also often
adversely affected by the existence of social security systems paying or promising to pay generous
pension benefits. This is more a problem for middle and high income countries, since in low income
countries social security systems are less well developed  and where they exist they usually have a very
small coverage.
Apart from discouraging  the development  of long-term  contractual savings, the social security
systems of most developing countries also suffer from their own internal financial and structural
problems.  These cause considerable  distortions in incentives  and the allocation of resources and cast
doubt on their long-term viability.
Demographic  Aging.  Much has been written recently about the pressing problems of social
security systems in Latin American and Eastern Europeal countries'.  Considerable  attention has also
been focused  on the problems  caused  by the progressive  aging  of the  populations  of developing  countries,
although demographic  aging in most developing  countries is by no means a current problem but rather
a poteintial  future problem of the second half of the next century.  In fact, the current problems facing
the social security systems  of developing  countries  stem from major faults  in design and implementation
and have little to do with the heavy burden imposed  by an aged population  and labor force.
I  For a comprehensive  worldwide  review of social security issues, see World Bank (1994). For
more specific discussions  of the experience  of individual  countries or regions, see Arrau and Schmidt-
Hebbel (1994), Arrau et al (1993), Davis (1993), Diamond  and Valdes-Prieto  (1994), Demirguc-Kunt
and Schwarz (1995), Fox (1994), Kane (1995a and 1995b), Mesa-Lago  (1989), McGreevey (1990),
Queisser (1991  and 1995), Schmidt-Hebbel  (1994), Vittas  (1993c),  Vittas and Iglesias  (1992), and Vittas
and Michelitsch  (1995).
4Strategic  Manipulation  and Evasion. Most developing  countries have young populations, in
some cases very young, where children represent more than half the total population. These countries
should  be able to operate their social  security systems  with low contribution  rates. But they have design
features  that encourage  evasion, income  understatement  when young and overstatement  near retirement,
early retirement  and "disability". These  design faults  cause  total revenues  from contributions  to be lower
and total payments for benefits higher than what they should be and often result in quite high required
contribution  rates for break even.
Extensive evasion as well as early retirement and disability cause the system dependency  ratio
to exceed by a big margin the demographic  old age dependency  ratio (for instance, in Argentina and
Hungary, the system dependency  ratio is nearly double the demographic  dependency  ratio, whereas in
advanced  OECD countries,  e.g., Switzerland  and Sweden,  there is usually  a small difference  between  the
two ratios).
Evasion  is encouraged  because  pensions  are not proportional  to a worker's years of service (and
contributions)  and lifetime income, but involve high accrual rates (2%, 4% or even 15%) for the first
few years of service  and a reference  income that is based on earnings  in the most recent few years before
retirement. In Brazil, for instance,  the accrual  rate is 15  % for the first five years and then drops to 1  %
for the ensuing 25 years. When the principle  of proportionality  is violated, strong incentives  are created
for strategic  manipulation  of the system  by workers  who  try to minimize  their contributions  and maximize
their benefits.
Strategic  manipulation  is further  encouraged  by early retirement  provisions  and lax conditions  for
disability pensions.  In several countries (including Costa Rica, Hungary and Uruguay), disability
pensions account for over 25 % of all pensioners, while in most countries the average retirement age is
well below the normal retirement age.
5Perverse  and Capricious  Redistribution. The social security systems  of many countries also
suffer from perverse and capricious redistribution. Perverse redistribution  occurs when low income
workers subsidize  the pensions  of high income  workers. Perverse  redistribution  may also occur from the
fact that low income workers in hazardous  industries  may have shorter life expectancies  on retirement
than high income workers in white collar jobs.
An even more widespread problem is the capricious redistribution caused by the impact of
inflation. Absent a properly indexed  system, large fluctuations  in the rate of inflation  may cause large
variations in the size of initial pensions and in the real value of pensions  in payment.  Indexing  initial
pensions  (by indexing  the definition  of reference  or base earnings)  and pensions  in payment  may  eliminate
the capricious redistribution  but will expose the system to strong financial  pressures, especially  if the
incentives  and opportunities  for strategic manipulation  are not removed.  Care is therefore needed to
avoid full indexation  of the pension system before other defaults  in the design of the system  are not first
corrected.
Lack of Funding. Most social security systems in developing  countries  operate on a "pay-as-
you-go", unfunded  basis. Although  many  were  originally  created  as funded  schemes,  they  were over time
converted de  facto or de jure into unfunded schemes, because of highly negative real returns on
accumulated  balances and an increase in benefits without  a commensurate  increase in contributions.
Unfunded  schemes  increase  the financial  burden on current  generations  of workers  and, given  the
progressive  demographic  aging, cause large intergenerational  transfers. But funded public schemes  may
not be a sustainable  answer  because  the utilization  of accumulated  resources  has more often  than not been
highly inefficient and wasteful.
Highly negative  real returns have  been  observed in many  developing  countries  with funded  public
schemes  (Egypt and several Anglophone  African countries, including Ghana, Nigeria and Zainbia, are
bad examples of this with reported real returns at well below minus ten per cent over long periods of
6time).  Use of social security or provident  fund balances as a captive  source of funds for financing  the
government  deficit and other public spending  with low nominal  returns in the face of high inflation  rates
erodes the real value of these balances  and fails to secure  the long-term  financial  protection  that funding
is supposed  to provide. The exceptions  to this general rule have been the provident funds of Malaysia
and (to a lesser degree) Singapore  and public pension funds in some OECD countries.  However, in
almost all cases, the returns  of private pension  funds have  been  higher  than those of public  pension funds.
IV.  BENEFITS OF REFORM
Securing  benerits. Advocates  of social security,  pension and insurance  reform  underscore  many
potential economic  and social benefits. However, the most important  benefit is probably  the ability to
avert a financial  insolvency  of the social security system and to continue the provision of pension and
other long-term benefits. A reformed  social security and pension system will be better able to provide
adequate but affordable and therefore sustainable benefits.  The connection  with insurance
reform stems from the fact that pension reform often involves an increased demand for term life
and disability insurance as well as for various forms of life annuities and this implies a need for
restructuring  and modernizing the life insurance industry.  And the link with nonlife insurance
stems from the similarities and close structural links that exist between the two main branches
of the insurance industry.
Funding and Aging.  One of the claimed benefits of social security and pension reform
is the promotion of well managed funded schemes that will be able to cope with the problems
of  progressive  demographic  aging.  Although  there  is  considerable validity  in  such claims,
funding  by  itself cannot provide  a full answer to the problems caused by aging (Barr  1992,
Vittas 1993b).  This is because no one can guarantee that real rates of return will remain higher
7than growth rates of real earnings with progressive  demographic  aging.  The rate of saving and
funding  that might be required  could  become  too large  and in some  sense  self-defeating  as higher
and higher levels of savings may cause further declines in real returns.  The answer to the
problem of aging must involve  a combination  of extending  the normal  retirement  age, increasing
the mandated  contribution  (forced  saving)  rate and lowering  the targeted  replacement  rate as well
as a greater reliance on funded schemes.
hnpact on Saving.  Another potential benefit from social security and pension reform
is an increase in the rate of saving that may accompany  a move from an unfunded  to a largely
funded system (or to a system  with a large funded second  pillar).  In principle, pension  funding
should lead to a higher saving rate.  But in practice there seems to be little correlation between
funding levels and saving rates.  Anglo-American  (US, UK, Canada, Australia, New Zealand
and South Africa)  and Scandinavian  countries  have high levels of pension funding  but very low
saving rates, while Switzerland,  Singapore  and Malaysia  have both high levels of funding and
high saving  rates.  In contrast,  and to complicate  matters further, many countries  with unfunded
schemes in Western Europe and East Asia have long exhibited  high saving rates.
The rate of saving is determined  by a host of factors, the most important  of which are
perhaps  economic  growth, fertility and household  access  to credit. In addition, the income  effect
may dominate the substitution  effect in pension funding, implying that high real returns on
pension fund balances may result in lower annual contributions  and thus lower saving rates,
given the targeted levels of benefits.  In practice, it would appear that funding can lead to an
increased rate of saving if it involves  a high rate of forced saving (high contribution  rate), low
real returns (as the income effect dominates  the substitution  effect), universal coverage, and
8limited access to household  credit.  Although this increase  would most likely be transitory, it
could still have a beneficial long-term  effect if it contributes  to higher economic  growth, which
could then sustain the higher level of saving.
Impact on Capital Markets.  While the quantitative  impact  of funded schemes  on the
rate of saving is debatable, there can be little doubt about its qualitative  effects. Pension  reform
and the promotion  of funded  schemes  causes  a large shift in favor  of long-term  financial  savings.
It also forces people to start saving at a younger age.  The availability  of substantial amounts
of  long-term resources has considerable potential benefits for the modernization of capital
markets, stimulating  financial  innovation  (Bodie 1990a,  Davis 1993)  and improving  information
disclosure.
It is sometimes argued that pension reform promoting funded schemes should not be
undertaken if capital markets are underdeveloped.  This is a  rather short-sighted approach
because it disregards the dynamic  interaction  between capital markets and contractual savings
institutions, the one reinforcing the growth, efficiency  and modernization  of the other.
However, promoting funded pension schemes raises some difficult policy questions
regarding investment  rules and the investment  of pension fund assets in overseas securities  and
in small firms and new ventures.  Also, when pension funds and other institutional investors
become large, the question of their role in corporate governance  becomes  very important. The
practical approach here is to  start with restrictive rules that ensure conservative investment
policies and to expand the range of opportunities for investing in more risky instruments,
including overseas securities, as the pension funds increase in size and develop their fund
management  skills.
9Impact  on Labor  Markets  and Redistribution.  Pension  and social  security  reform may
also have important and beneficial implications  for the functioning of labor markets if the
incentives for strategic manipulation  are removed and any restrictions on labor mobility are
substantially weakened.  Overall economic efficiency will be enhanced if migration to the
informal labor markets is reduced, although  in many countries  strategic manipulation  involves
understatement  of earnings and extensive  use of untaxed fringe benefits rather than a migration
to the informal economy.  Pension reform may also eliminate  or at least substantially  reduce
the occurrence of perverse and capricious  redistribution  and it may establish  better foundations
for  achieving modest but  desirable redistribution.  Under a  reformed pension  system,
contributions  will likely be perceived  as deferred income rather than a payroll tax.
Tax Issues, Operating Costs and the Problem of Annuities.  Pension and social
security reform will also have to grapple with some other important issues with substantial
operational implications.  For  instance, funded schemes are usually supported with fiscal
incentives  involving  tax deferral on any amount  of contractual  saving. In this respect, tax credits
could involve lower tax expenditures  and weaker regressive effects than income deductions.
Promoting systems that minimize operating costs, while maximizing  real returns, or at least
achieving  sufficiently  high real returns, seems essential  but rather difficult to attain.
An equally difficult issue relates to the functioning  of annuities  markets, which suffer in
almost  all  countries  from  the  problems of  adverse selection,  information deficiencies,
uncertainty, and high selling  costs.  Making  compulsory  the purchase of some efficient type of
annuity (e.g.,  indexed or variable, term certain, joint  and last survivor annuity) may be a
necessary  component  of a mandated  funded pension system.
1 0Implications for Insurance Markets.  As already noted, one of the implications of
pension and social security  reform is the creation of a strong (compulsory)  demand for term life
and disability insurance by  active workers and of  annuity products by  retiring workers.
Reforming the insurance sector may thus be as important  for the success  of pension  reform as
the resolution of funding, tax and investment  issues.
V.  SEQUENCING THE REFORM
One of the most difficult issues facing  any type of reform is how to sequence  particular
reform measures.  Clearly, the answer  must differ from country  to country  and must take account
of local circumstances,  not least of which is the political  feasibility  of particular measures.
Economists  and specialist  advisers  often pay lip service to such country specific  factors
and then proceed to propose an optimal path of reform that disregards  the constraints of local
factors. The alternative, and more practical, approach  is to effect reform wherever  it is feasible
and to work to complete  the reform program as conditions  become  ripe.  Since local conditions
are almost never there to support an optimal path of reform, most countries  follow the second
more practical approach.
Nevertheless,  it is important  to emphasize  that the potential  benefits  of a reform program
will not be fully realized until the program is completed, while doing things in a suboptimal
order may increase  the costs of transition  and may delay considerably  the attainment  of the full
11benefits of reform.  On the other hand, if political and social conditions are not ripe for some
reform measures, waiting until they become  ripe may also be quite costly.
There is one reform measure that should not be undertaken out of order.  This is the
indexation  of pensions  in payment  before other measures  are taken to restructure  and downsize
the public pillar.  Indexing the pension system prematurely is a recipe  for  certain  financial
disaster, yet many countries from Italy and Greece to Argentina, Poland and Hungary have
indexed pensions  prematurely  and have suffered  the adverse  consequences.
In this paper, the various reform measures are divided into four sets of actions.  The
implied optimal  order is to first restructure  and downsize  the existing  public pension  pillar, then
to establish a multi-pillar structure with a mandatory  or voluntary fully funded second pillar,
then to streamline  the regulatory  framework  for pension  funds and insurance  companies,  and last
to formulate  and implement  a long-term  transition  plan. It is, however, recognized  that in many
countries steps two and three (i.e.,  creating a multi-pillar structure through the promotion of
voluntary supplementary  pension schemes and streamlining the regulatory framework) may
precede step one, i.e. the restructuring  and downsizing  of the existing  public pillar.
.Several  transitional  economies  in Eastern Europe, most notably Hungary and the Czech
Republic, appear to be following  this latter approach  (Vittas  and Michelitsch  1995). The main
reason seems  to be the lack of political  support for a wide-ranging  reform of social security  and
the need to maintain  broad political support  for the more urgent task of enterprise  restructuring.
It should, however, be emphasized  that the scope  for supplementary  pension  funds  and especially
for a large increase in their role and in their assets will remain limited as long as social security
contributions  continue to be as high as 60% of wages (as they are in Hungary).  No amount of
12tax incentives can overcome this problem, except for that part of the income of high salary
workers that is not subject to social security contributions.
Restructuring  and Downsizing  Social Pensions
To reduce the size of unfunded future pension  liabilities  and limit the opportunities  for
strategic manipulation, a series of reforms of the existing public pillar are often necessary.
These include the following:
*  Link normal  retirement  age to life expectancy  at retirement. The basic idea is to aim
for anywhere between 15 or 20 years of average life in retirement.  Extending the
retirement age is  often faced with  strong opposition from both  older and younger
workers.  This is because of the widespread  perception  that delaying the retirement of
older workers will deprive  young  workers of employment  opportunities. However, there
is little evidence that a low normal retirement  age, and early retirement  more generally,
contribute to higher employment  of young workers.
*  Eliminate  preferential  treatment  of some types of workers. This should, for instance,
cover female  civil servants  with children  who are entitled  in many countries  to retire with
a full pension after 15 or 20 years of service.
*  Tighten conditions of eligibility for disability pensions and for early retirement.
Streamlining  disability  pensions  is one of the most difficult  challenges. What are needed
are independent medical committees to approve disability pensions on objective and
clearly  specified criteria.  With  regard to  early retirement,  appropriate actuarial
adjustments  (decrements  for early retirement  and increments  for late retirement) could
13be introduced. These could help overcome  political  hostility  to the idea of extending  the
normal retirement age.
*  Use longer averaging  periods for determining  initial pensions. If past records exist
and are in good order, add two or three years every year to the definition of the base
until full career earnings are taken into account.  If past records are deficient, add one
year each year.  To maintain the real value of past earnings, adjust yearly nominal
earnings by an appropriate earnings index or use a points system (which credits points
for every year of service and amounts  to the same thing as indexing  nominal  earnings).
*  Use proportionality  principle and linear accrual rates for the calculation  of initial
pensions, including minimum  pensions. Consider  having a system that is based both
on years of contributions  and level of average indexed lifetime  earnings.
*  Lower targeted replacement  rate to a more affordable  level.  30%, or at most 40%,
of the average economy  wage for a worker with average wages and full careers would
be adequate and affordable in most countries.  The targeted replacement  rate could be
linked to the system  dependency  ratio to ensure  that the required contribution  rate for the
public pillar is less than 10% or 12% of wages. For instance, if the system  dependency
ratio is 30%, a replacement  rate of 40% will require a contribution  rate of 12%  for break
even.  If the system dependency  ratio rises to 40% with demographic aging, then the
targeted replacement rate could be lowered to 30% in  order to  leave the  required
contribution  rate at 12%.
*  Reduce the dispersion  of pensions. If there is a wide dispersion  between minimum  and
maximum  pensions, take measures such as differential  ad hoc adjustments  for inflation
14to reduce such dispersion. This will contain the total cost of pensions  and also promote
redistribution in favor of low income workers.  Measures to reduce the dispersion of
pensions would be essential  where high pensions  are not related  to a person's history of
contributions  and are associated  with strategic  manipulation  and other faults in the design
of pension system.
*  Streamline the tax treatment  of pensions and contributions. Ideally contributions
should benefit from some advantageous  tax treatment, while pensions  should be subject
to income  tax as any other source of income. As already  noted above, the most equitable
and least expensive form of tax advantage  is to offer a tax credit to all workers who
contribute a given percentage  of their income to the pension system. A version of this
approach is used in the Czech Republic and has recently been proposed for Australia
(Vittas and Michelitsch 1995, Vittas 1995).  In funded pension schemes, investment
income should also be exempt from income  tax.
*  Lower contribution rate to create room for supplementary  private pension funds,
whether  mandatory or voluntary.  Clearly, in countries with very highr  contribution
rates, failure to lower them to more reasonable  levels would severely limit the scope for
large supplementary  schemes.
*  After implementing  the above reforms, index pensions in  payment.  Preferably,
indexation  should  be to the arithmetic  mean of the price and wage index. An alternative
approach is to index pensions  in payment  to the nominal  wage index less 1.5% or 2%
or some other number reflecting  a targeted planned reduction in the relative position of
pensions  vis-a-vis  wages. Such  indexation  would allow  pensioners  to partake in the fruits
15of continued  high economic  growth, but without  exposing  the pension  system  to financial
pressures if real wages fall.
*  Consider  rmancing  public pillar from general revenue. This option should only be
considered if participation in the public pillar is near universal and especially if low
income workers in  rural  areas are  covered.  Otherwise, uncovered workers and
consumers in the rural areas could end up subsidizing  wealthier covered  workers in
urban areas.
*  To improve  the rmancing  position  of the public  pillar, take measures  to fight evasion
and improve  collections. Such measures  should  not, however, be seen as a long-term
substitute for  other  reform measures as  an  unfunded scheme with  high  targeted
replacement  rates would not be viable in the long run.
Take measures  to improve  the administrative  capability  of social security  institutions
responsible  for the public pillar and to enhance  their investment  performance. Such
measures should aim to  lower administrative  costs, which are  very high  in  many
countries, and to raise investment  returns, which  tend to be very low. But administrative
reforms should be linked to the overall reform program and should not be seen as a
substitute for it.
Establishing  a Multi-Pillar  Structure
The formulation of a long-term plan for the creation of a multi-pillar structure may
precede the restructuring  and downsizing  of the public pillar, while as already noted even the
establishment  of supplementary  pension  funds  may also do so.  The economic  argument  in favor
16of a multi-pillar structure is a better alignment  of different pillars with the basic objectives  of
pension systems, i.e. the first pillar for redistribution, the second pillar for saving, and both
pillars for insurance. The practical argument  is that there is considerable  uncertainty  regarding
the robustness of different pillars over the long run.  We know that unfunded public pillars
cannot alone provide the answer  but we do not know yet whether  fully funded  private pillars can
do so.  This suggests  that a policy of diversifying  across providers would make good practical
sense, at least until we accumulate  enough evidence  that the funded private pillar can be stable,
robust and efficient in  the  long run.  The following issues would need to  be  covered in
establishing  a multi-pillar structure 2:
*  Consider structure of public pillar.  This relates to whether the public pillar should
take the form of state guarantees for a minimum pension as in Chile, or a two-part
structure as in Switzerland, or a flat benefit for all workers as in the Netherlands  and
more recently  Argentina, or a means-tested  universal  benefit for all residents  as in South
Africa.  Each has  its advantages and disadvantages, which would require careful
consideration. The role of state guarantees,  not only for minimum  pensions  but also for
the solvency  of pension  fund managers  and insurance  companies, would  also need to be
addressed in the context of the objectives  of general social policy.
*  Create mandatory or voluntary second pillar.  This will require deciding on the
voluntary or mandatory  nature of the second  pillar and defining its coverage, minimum
level of contribution, tax treatment,  and extent of choice by workers.
2  A fuller discussion  of the issues  raised  by multi-pillar  structures  is contained  in World Bank
(1994). See  also  Vittas  (1993a)  for a discussion  of  the  benefits  of combining  the  strong  points  of  different
pillars.
17*  Choose between employer-based  and nonemployer-based  schemes.  The latter are
generally fully  funded,  fully  vested and  fully  portable and  based  on  individual
capitalization  schemes. Employer-based  schemes  may also be based  on so-called  defined
benefit or final salary schemes.  The main advantage of such schemes is the offer of
retirement income insurance by  employers, though this is conditional on continued
employment with the same employer as well as on the integrity and solvency of the
sponsoring  employer (Bodie 1990b). They usually involve  collective  capitalization  and
may suffer from  inadequate funding and unreasonable limitations on  vesting and
portability  that may restrict unduly labor mobility  and cause inequitable  treatment among
workers.
*  Consider  use of variable  contribution  rates to overcome  concern about passing the
investment  and replacement  risk  to workers. Variable  contribution  rates could  be reset
periodically  and on a voluntary  basis to achieve  a certain  targeted replacement  rate once
account is taken of past and projected  salary growth and investment  income.
*  Choose between centralized  and decentralized  management. The former achieves
lower operating  costs but may suffer from low investment  returns.  The latter, if based
on nonemployer  schemes, may suffer from high selling and other operating costs.  Of
course, what matters most is the net investment  return and this tends to be higher among
decentralized  schemes.  A compromise  is either to authorize  employer-based  schemes
based on individual  capitalization  accounts or to combine centralized management  of
administrative  functions  (collection  of contributions,  payment  of pensions, maintenance
of records, despatch of statement, etc.) with decentralized  management  of investment
18funds.  Opting for centralized  management  would clearly require administrative  reform
of  existing institutions, or establishment  of  new ones, to  undertake the  centralized
functions.
*  Require term life and disability insurance.  To ensure that the families of active
workers are fully protected from financial  loss resulting from the death or disability of
an active worker, these two types of insurance should be mandated by the system.
Administrators of pension schemes should be required to offer the same terms and
conditions on all workers through the purchase or establishment  of appropriate group
policies.  Term liie and disability insurance represent defined benefits in what would
otherwise be defined contribution schemes.  Their pricing requires careful actuarial
assessments  and periodic reviews.
*  Require annuitization  of benefits or use of scheduled graduated  withdrawals. To
ensure that retired workers have sufficient  funds for their old age and avoid the risk of
outliving their savings, either the purchase of suitable  annuities should be mandated  or
withdrawals  from the accounts  should  be gradual  and subject  to a well defined schedule
that takes account  of the life expectancy  of the workers  and their surviving  beneficiaries.
The rules for any lump sum benefits on retirement  should be clearly specified.
Streamlining  the Regulatory  Framework
As already noted, one of the traditional  arguments  against funded schemes  in developing
countries  was the absence  of efficient, stable, well regulated  and robust fmancial  systems. Even
in developed  countries  the historical  instability  of financial  systems was a basic reason for the
19emergence and growth of unfunded  or at most partially funded social security systems. But in
the postwar period financial systems have become much more stable and robust and financial
regulation and supervision  much more sophisticated  and effective, even though financial  crises
and setbacks  have not been fully eliminated.
To be effective, social security, pension and insurance reform in developing  countries
requires an extensive streamlining  of the regulatory  framework. This should  cover not only the
providers of pension and insurance  products, but also the providers of other financial services
(such as payment  services) and the securities  markets. Support services  in the legal, accounting
and auditing  spheres must also be streamlined  and modernized. The pace of modernization  and
regulatory  reform in securities markets and support services  could of course be reinforced by
the creation of large pension fund and insurance sectors, but parallel and gradual progress on
several fronts would  be essential for the ultimate success  of the broader reform program.
With regard to the providers of pension  and insurance  products,  regulatory  reform should
cover the creation or reorganization of regulatory agencies, the establishment  of objective
authorization criteria,  the  application of  sound solvency and  investment rules,  and  the
introduction  of appropriate  information  disclosure  and consumer  protection  standards. The role
of state guarantees  would also be a major aspect of the regulatory  framework.
*  Create or re-organize  regulatory  agencies. In many developing  countries, regulators
have traditionally  been concerned with verifying compliance with arbitrary price and
product controls rather than with promoting  efficient, contestable  markets. The new or
re-organized agencies must emphasize market discipline, solvency monitoring and
consumer  protection  and must employ  experienced  professionals. Extensive  training  may
20be required, while consultation  and cooperation  with market practitioners  would also be
essential.
*  Strengthen  supervision  and intervention  powers  of regulators. To ensure the stability
of the system and compliance  with solvency,  investment  and consumer  protection rules,
regulators  must exercise  effective supervision  through  both off-site surveillance  and on-
site inspection. They must also have effective  intervention  powers  to enforce corrective
measures.
*  Establish objective  criteria for entry and exit.  These should  set out the authorization
criteria for insurance  companies  and pension  fund managers, establish  rules for the exit
of insolvent entities, open the market to new domestic and foreign competition, and
generally aim to create a contestable  but stable market.  This may imply a sufficiently
but not prohibitively  high minimum  capital requirement.
*  Develop solvency rules and rely on solvency monitoring  rather than product and
price controls.  The rules should specify the required solvency margins and capital
reserves in relation to the total income and total assets of individual  institutions. They
should also emphasize solvency monitoring both by the regulators and by actuaries,
auditors and other professionals employed by  individual institutions.  Encourage
reasonable access to international  reinsurance  markets by eliminating or reducing local
retention ratios and applying  prudential  norms to avoid excessive  reinsurance.
*  Apply investment rules that  underscore profitability and  safety and  promote
diversification  strategies.  Such rules should involve maximum limits and avoid the
imposition  of minimum requirements  that often result in the of pension and insurance
21reserves  as a captive  source  for funding  budget  deficits. Investment  rules should  become
more liberal as financial  markets  become  more sophisticated  and mature and should aim
to adopt the "prudent  man" rule prevalent  in Anglo-American  countries. Diversification
of investments  into overseas  securities  should  also be contemplated,  perhaps  in line with
the size and structure  of the local market.  A country  with a small, undiversified  market
would need to authorize a higher limit for overseas  assets than a country with a large,
diversified  market.
*  Establish detailed reporting and  information disclosure as  well  as  consumer
protection  standards. Pension contracts have a very long time span of up to 60 years,
40 years in active employment  and 20 years in retirement. Life insurance  contracts  also
have long terms, exceeding 10 years and reaching  40 years in the case of pension-linked
contracts.  For  this reason, adequate and meaningful information disclosure is very
important  as is protection of workers and policyholders.
*  ?Consider  appropriate  role for state guarantees. Because  of their very long time span
and the economic uncertainties that may affect the returns of different entities and
products, governments are often forced to provide state guarantees to workers and
policyholders. These  may cover the provision  of minimum  pensions  or they may protect
workers and policyholders  against the insolvency  of the institutions concerned.  The
scope  and financing  of state guarantees  would  be very important  ingredients  of the whole
reform  program. But  care should  be taken to avoid undermining  the financial  disciplines
of market-based  funded schemes  and inadvertently  or indirectly  transforming  the system
back to an unfunded "pay-as-you-go"  one.
22Formulate  Transition  Plan
Successful  implementation  of social security,  pension and insurance  reform requires the
formulation  of a detailed transition plan.  This should identify  the most important actions and
the preparatory stages that must be completed before and after the launching of the reform
program.  A successful  reform program will probably take three to four years to prepare and
many more years to implement.
*  Develop  an actuarial  model to estimate  transition  costs. One of the most difficult and
often intractable  questions  is the estimation  of the costs of transition from a "pay-as-you-
go" to a multi-pillar  scheme  with a fully funded  component. Despite  the lack of accurate
and detailed records, use of an actuarial model would be essential for estimating these
costs.
*  Use compensatory  pensions  or recognition  bonds for vested pension rights.  One of
the greatest  obstacles  of pension  reform is how to handle the vested  pension  rights in the
old  system.  Chile has  opted for  the use of  recognition bonds whereby workers
transferring to  the  new  funded  scheme are  issued with  bonds  recognizing their
accumulated  pension  rights.  The recognition  bonds earn real interest at 4% per year and
mature when the workers retire.  Thus, the liability of the state is spread over many
years. Argentina  which  has retained  an explicit  public  pillar offering  a minimum  pension
to all workers has opted for the use of compensatory  pensions, whereby workers with
accumulated  pension rights will receive two pensions  from the state - one relating  to the
minimum pension and the other relating to their accumulated  pension rights.  The cost
of the transition is spread over a longer period in the Argentine  system, which may thus
23have more appeal for countries (such as those of Eastern Europe) with large levels of
current pension spending.
*  Draft and enact laws for social security, pension  and insurance reform.  Drafting
these laws would  be more effective  if experts  with knowledge  of foreign experiences  are
employed along side local specialists. In this way, the lessons  from the experience of
other countries  will be utilized, while the drafted  and enacted  laws will also comply  with
local practice and customs.  The time required for drafting good laws should not be
underestimated,  while the difficulty  of maintaining  the integrity and logic of proposed
legislation through democratically  elected legislatures  should not be overlooked.
*  Issue specific regulations  for pension  funds and insurance  companies. Laws usually
cover the basic principles that should govern the operations of pension funds and
insurance  companies. Detailed  regulations  are normally  required for a host of topics that
would be subject to periodic review  and re-assessment. The regulatory  agencies  should
be properly staffed  and motivated  to issue well drafted, sensible  and timely regulations.
Working with market practitioners  and professional  experts will help expedite the whole
process.
*  Train  regulators and  professional staff,  including fund  managers, actuaries,
accountants  and auditors. In most developing  countries,  an extensive  training program
would be needed to raise the professional standard of regulators and to help develop
experienced  professionals.
*  Undertake publicity campaign to explain reform program.  A well mounted and
effective publicity campaign could help widen public support for the  program by
24explaining its benefits and spelling out the nonviability and inefficiency of  existing
arrangements.
VI.  CONCLUSION
This paper has discussed  briefly the sequencing  of social security,  pension  and insurance
reform.  The issues involved  are quite complex  and this paper has done little more than provide
a short, and far from exhaustive, checklist of what needs to be done.  The paper has also
discussed  briefly the benefits of reform.
In conclusion,  it is perhaps important  to underscore  the basic objectives  of an ambitious
reform program.  These can be summarized  as follows:
a.  Avoid the insolvency  of the social security system (this is a longer run problem
for developing countries  with young populations)  and thus ensure the provision
of adequate but affordable  and thus sustainable  pension benefits.
b.  Remove  incentives  that encourage  strategic  manipulation  and hamper  the efficient
functioning  of labor markets.
c.  Control the occurrence  of perverse and capricious  redistribution  by removing the
many design faults that currently afflict security systems in most developing
countries.
d.  Generate long-term financial savings that can help stimulate the modernization
and growth of capital markets, finance long-term investments,  and facilitate the
privatization  program.
25Although  there is no single optimal  way of sequencing  and pacing the reform program,
it is important  to emphasize  that the full benefits of the reform will not be realized  until existing
social pension systems are restructured  and downsized,  contribution  rates are lowered, and the
scope for private pension  funds, whether voluntary  or mandatory, is increased. However, one
often ignored imperative  is to defer an indexation  of the pension system until its many design
faults are corrected.  Finally, insurance  sector reform is essential for the success  of the whole
program because of the close links between pension  reform and the provision of life, disability
and annuity insurance  services.
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